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Abstract—Ensuring a good level of cybersecurity of global
IT systems requires that specific procedures and cooperation
frameworks be adopted for reporting threats and for coordi-
nating the activities undertaken by individual entities. Tech-
nical infrastructure enabling safe and reliable online collabo-
ration between all teams responsible for security is an impor-
tant element of the system as well. With the above taken into
consideration, the paper presents a comprehensive distributed
solution for continuous monitoring and detection of threats
that may affect services that provision is essential to security
and broadly understood the state’s economic interests. The
said solution allows to collect, process and share distributed
knowledge on hazard events. The partnership-based model of
cooperation between the system’s users allows the teams to un-
dertake specific activities at the central level, facilitates global
cyber threat awareness, and enhances the process of predict-
ing and assessing cyber risks in order to ensure a near-real-
time response. The paper presents an overview of the system’s
architecture, its main components, features, and threat intel-
ligence tools supporting the safe sharing of information con-
cerning specific events. It also offers a brief overview of the
system’s deployment and its testing in an operational environ-
ment of NASK’s Computer Security Incident Response Team
(CSIRT) and Security Operation Center (SOC) of essential
services operators.
Keywords—cybersecurity awareness, risk and threat propaga-
tion, threat intelligence.
1. Introduction
An increasing number of ever more sophisticated and com-
plex cyberattacks may be observed. For instance, the Com-
puter Emergency Response Team being a part of the NASK
– National Research Institute registered 10,447 such inci-
dents in 2020. The said number was the largest recorded
in history and represented the fastest year-on-year increase.
Phishing was the most common type of attack accounting
for proximately 67.2% of all incidents. The use of malicious
software was the second most common type of threads,
with its share equaling approximately 7.1%. Such attacks
pose a serious threat to information technology (IT) systems
supporting services that are of critical importance for the
society. They may lead to the disruption in the provision of
such services, breaching national security, impacting public
and economic order, violating civil rights and freedoms, as
well as endangering human life.
In order to protect IT systems, new functionalities must be
implemented to enable early detection of threats, to assess
their negative impact and to prevent them. Good level of
situational cyberspace awareness needs to be achieved as
well in order to collect, in real-time, information on threats
and risks identified and on their impact on the behavior of
systems, as well as on the related processes and services.
Achievement of global cybersecurity of IT systems requires
that procedures and cooperation networks be established
to facilitate the reporting of incidents and to coordinate
the actions undertaken. It is also recommended to create
a technical infrastructure allowing a safe and reliable on-
line collaboration of all teams responsible for cybersecurity.
Detailed identification of vulnerabilities of information and
operational technologies (IT/OT) and of the impact that cy-
ber threat events exert on the related processes and services
is important as well.
However, as presented in [1], [2], the achievement of such
a goal is difficult due to the considerable level of inter de-
pendence of the systems and the fact that they share the
same information and communications technology (ICT)
resources. The interrelations between individual services
are of a diverse and complex nature [3], and yet they need
to be determined precisely in order to identify threats in cy-
berspace and to assess their impact on the level of security.
Many works devoted to this issue, such as [4]–[6], confirm
the need of modeling the network of interdependent infras-
tructures in order to identify its critical components and to
better understand the scale and scope of potential threats.
Such an approach enables early identification of threats and
triggers alerts allowing to take preemptive actions in order
to mitigate the risk encountered. However, in order to cre-
ate a network of services that reliably reflects the actual
condition of and the interrelations between its components,
it is necessary to obtain detailed and verifiable data from
service providers. Furthermore, an effective threat response
requires close cooperation between IT security analysis and
management teams from all interdependent entities.
The procedures of cooperation between all entities respon-
sible for IT security needs to be developed as well, in order
to ensure a clear situational awareness picture and the high-
est level of protection. It is also desirable to establish spe-
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cific solutions encouraging cooperation and ensuring that
the vital interests of all cooperating parties are protected.
These activities should be supported by technical systems
enabling efficient acquisition, processing and distribution of
information concerning threats and their potential impacts.
This paper presents an innovative and scalable solution that
allows organizations to collect, process and share threat-
related information in order to predict and assess the risk
involved, and to share distributed knowledge in order to
provide a near-real-time response. The said solution fo-
cuses on procedural and technical aspects of service net-
work modeling, as well as on processes related to aggrega-
tion of knowledge distributed across multiple databases, as-
sessment of risk, propagation of threats, building a common
operational picture and sharing threat-related information.
A brief overview of the process of deploying the system
and testing it in a real-life environment is given as well.
The main contributions of this paper are:
• presentation of a novel collaborative distributed sys-
tem facilitating online cyber threat awareness;
• presentation of an innovative concept for building
a network of interdependent services and for rely-
ing on such a network in assessing the threats and
the related risks.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 gives a brief review of the initiatives aiming to
improve the level of IT security. Section 3 describes the
system’s architecture, its main components, features and
properties in terms of flexibility, extensibility and scala-
bility. Selected solutions enabling to assess the impact of
potential threats on the provision of services, as well as
those enabling to collect, process, and secure information
related to hazardous events between all National Platform
for Cybersecurity (NPC) users are presented in Section 4.
The paper concludes with an overview of the system’s de-
ployment and with proposals concerning future work.
2. Related Work
Many international and national initiatives have been under-
taken recently to boost the security of IT systems in order
to improve reliability and availability of services. The Di-
rective of the European Parliament and of the Council [8]
on security of network and information systems (NIS) of
6 July 2016 (hereinafter referred to as the NIS Directive)
encourages a number of such initiatives. The NIS Direc-
tive imposes, on the Member States, the obligation to im-
plement several legal measures, including by establishing
national strategies for the security of networks and informa-
tion systems, and sets forth requirements and procedures for
reporting cybersecurity incidents by service operators and
providers. In response to this, the European Telecommuni-
cations Standard Institutes (ETSI) [9] and many European
countries established their strategies to implement the re-
quirements of the NIS Directive1.
For example, the CS-AWARE project [10], launched under
the Horizon 2020 program, focuses on creating solutions
targeted for local public administration authorities, non-
governmental organizations, as well as small- and medium-
sized companies. The tools developed enable automatic
detection, classification, and visualization of computer in-
cidents in near-real-time, supporting the prevention or mit-
igation of the effects of such events. The solutions are
based on mechanisms for sharing information about actual
threats, relying on big data analysis and processing. By
leveraging the existing processes of sharing cybersecurity-
related information, CS-AWARE enables and improves in-
cident detection and meets the information sharing-related
requirements of the NIS Directive.
Another interesting approach to improve an organization’s
ongoing awareness of the risk posed to its business by cy-
bersecurity attacks has been developed as part of the PRO-
TECTIVE project [11]. The said approach allows to raise
the level of situational awareness by enhancing the corre-
lation and prioritization of security alerts, therefore pin-
pointing the relevance of the organization’s assets to its
business. Using the context-awareness approach, any orga-
nization may identify its key business goals and may define
the relationships between such goals, simultaneously deter-
mining information and computer assets of critical impor-
tance. This data is combined with near-real-time scoring
of the assets’ vulnerability levels. This helps rank alerts
based on their potential damage to the threatened assets
and business.
Many new solutions focus on increasing the awareness of
cyber threats and on improving the level network and in-
formation system security. For example, an interesting ap-
proach to the problem of building common cybersecurity
awareness by critical infrastructure operators is presented
in [12]. By aggregating, analyzing and correlating data
obtained from security management systems, a global cy-
bersecurity picture is created allowing also, due to the links
between critical infrastructure elements, to anticipate threat
propagation-related risks. An inspiring proposal of an IT
system for collaborative cyber incident management for the
European interconnected critical infrastructure is presented
in [7].
The Polish Parliament passed the Act on the National Cy-
bersecurity System (NCS) [13] which specifies the follow-
ing: organizational framework of the system, tasks and re-
sponsibilities of all entities involved, the manner in which
supervision and control over the implementation of the
Act is exercised, as well as the scope of the cybersecu-
rity strategy. This aims to create a comprehensive solution
for boosting protection against threats in Poland and for
enabling effective cooperation with other Member States.
The Act is building on service operators, digital service
1more information on status of NIS Directive implementation in EU




providers and public entities. The NCS is to be managed
at the operational level by three Computer Security Inci-
dent Response Teams (CSIRT GOV, CSIRT MON, CSIRT
NASK), and – at the central level, the Governmental Repre-
sentative for Cybersecurity and the Board for Cybersecurity.
The NCS concept requires its components and the related
entities to assume responsibility for several aspects. In par-
ticular, essential service operators are required to imple-
ment security management tools within their information
systems to support the provision of services. They are
obliged, inter alia, to perform risk assessment and to man-
agement incidents on an on-going basis, to collect informa-
tion on cyber threats and vulnerabilities of the information
system supporting the provision of a given service, and to
report serious incidents, to the appropriate CSIRT, within
24 hours at the latest. CSIRT teams are required to imple-
ment a coherent and comprehensive risk management sys-
tem at the national level, to undertake actions to mitigate
cyber threats of cross-sectoral and cross-border character,
and to coordinate the handling of the reported incidents.
Each CSIRT has a clearly defined scope of responsibilities
and a set of entities is supervises. CSIRT tasks include
monitoring cyber threats and estimating risks related to the
disclosed cyber threats, including by performing dynamic
risk assessment at the national level, classifying incidents
and coordinating the process of handling such incidents.
The CyberSecIdent research program focusing on “Cyber-
security and e-Identity” was launched for the purpose of
implementing the NIS Directive. The research project ti-
tled “National Platform for Cybersecurity” (NPC) was con-
ducted between 2017 and 2020 within the framework of
the program. Its aim was to develop a prototype integrated
system used for continuous monitoring, detection of and
warning about threats and risks affecting or likely to affect
the quality and continuity of services whose deterioration
may cause significant damage to the overall security level.
3. NPC System Overview
3.1. System Architecture
The NPC consists of four systems (Fig. 1):
• Edge systems (ES) located within the customers’2
infrastructure, serving as the NPC’s portals to the
platform resources,
• Operations center system (OCS), i.e. an application
system supporting situational cyberspace awareness
and constituting a central point for exchanging in-
formation on cybersecurity. By default, there is one
OCS instance within the platform, but the architec-
ture allows for the existence of more centers that ex-
change data with each other,
• Management system (MS) which manages both the
application and network layers of the NPC,
2Customer is an entity that provides essential and/or digital services and
participates in exchanging cybersecurity data over the edge system
• NPC backbone network (BN), i.e. dedicated commu-
nication infrastructure that enables secure informa-
tion exchange between the platform systems (mainly
OCS and ES) in wide area networks.
The operations center and the edge systems ensure inte-
gration with the user’s systems that, as a rule, are located
in the operator’s private networks and may initiate data
exchange with the platform systems, such as the malware
information sharing platform (MISP), security information
and event management (SIEM) system or incident manage-
ment (IM) system.
The OCS retrieves and aggregates data from external
sources assumed to be located in untrusted networks. These
include, for instance, network security incident exchange
database (n6), national vulnerability database (NVD) or
vulnerability database (vulners.com). The OCS initiates
communication and retrieves the data, but the source cannot
initiate communication with the OCS.
The management system includes a set of tools and services
such as:
• managing a public key infrastructure,
• managing the configuration of systems and applica-
tions,
• managing the configuration of network devices of the
NPC backbone network,
• monitoring the security status of the platform and all
system components,
• maintaining a replica of the system directory.
The key functions of the platform are performed by appli-
cation systems (i.e. OCS and ES). The system architecture
developed is universal (Fig. 2) and enables to implement
specific OCS and ES solutions.
The application system architecture includes:
• front-end load-balancing layer for HTTP/HTTPS pro-
tocols, designed to provide the users and local sys-
tems with a simplified interface for highly available
applications,
• application layer implemented by a highly available
cluster containing domain-specific, interconnected
applications, called microservices, responsible for the
system’s business logic. The following applications
within this cluster operate in special security zones:
— application gateway ensuring the secure sharing
of resources between the NPC systems,
— data importer for data acquisition from external
sources deployed only in the OCS,
• back-end load balancing layer for various protocols
ensuring unified interfaces with the services provided
for the applications,
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Fig. 1. NPC architecture.
Fig. 2. Application system architecture.
• database back-end layer containing the services pro-
vided for the application, such as, for instance:
— database cluster that stores operational data,
— directory service, i.e. a database of the NPC users
and their permissions,
— search service enabling full text searches covering
the operational data,
— message broker providing asynchronous message
exchange between applications.
The application system may run in a stand-alone or high-
availability configuration, and its components, services, and
service layers are developed in a high availability config-
uration, i.e. are distributed over many physical resources.
The ES may exchange data without the OCS being present.
In the case of a complete or partial network outage, all ap-
plication systems are capable of operating properly. Data
that have not been sent due to network failure or unavail-
ability of the system are stored locally until the problem is
resolved. The NPC applications were deployed on a self-
hosted Kubernetes platform that provides scalability and
a high level of availability.
3.2. Information Processes
Operation of the NPC system relies on a partner-like col-
laboration between its users, meaning that service providers
are free to decide whether to join the platform and comply
with mutually accepted cooperation principles, especially
those pertaining to the protection of the data shared.
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The security-specific data are exchanged between CSIRT
and the related service provider. There is also a possibility
of sharing some data between a group of users in compli-
ance with the applicable security requirements. Such an
exchange may occur, for instance, when OCS is temporar-
ily unavailable or if the user wants to deliver urgent data
to a group of users, such as those belonging to the same
business group or sector. It should be stressed that all data
exchanged directly between the users have to be submitted
to the OCS as well.
The exchange of information is carried out within the func-
tional processes, i.e. when surveying the service providers,
handling incident reports, assessing the risk, exchanging
information on security events, providing warnings about
threats and risks, sharing information on vulnerabilities,
and issuing recommendations.
The service providers (ES users) are obliged to provide the
following types of data to the OCS:
• detailed information on the services rendered, on the
conditions for providing such services and on the po-
tential consequences related to disruptions of their
continuity or quality,
• notification of incidents that would exert a significant
disruptive effect on the provision of services, includ-
ing detailed incident descriptions and their potential
consequences (i.e. impact on the services rendered),
• outcomes of risk assessment processes associated
with the services rendered.
In addition, they may provide the OCS with reports on
newly discovered vulnerabilities and the indicators of com-
promise (IoC), the results of their analysis, information on
suspicious data, raw data requiring for detailed studies, and
information about the technologies used.
The OCS processes and analyses data collected from exter-
nal threat sources, as well as those submitted by ES users
and shares its own information resources in order to en-
sure a quick and effective response to existing or potential
threats. The OCS performs a significant role in the provid-
ing crucial processes that include:
• providing information on the present cybersecurity
status of the services, at local and national level,
• managing incident reporting,
• gathering vulnerability data from external sources
and sharing the integrated vulnerability database with
NPC users,
• modeling the interdependencies between services,
• predicting threats and risks propagation and their im-
pact on cyberspace security,
• analyzing security risks at the national level,
• sharing knowledge supporting technical analysis of
threats,
• distributing security warnings,
• providing NPC users with recommendations regard-
ing the desired actions to increase the protection of
their information infrastructure.
Data are transferred from the ES in unicast mode, while the
OCS may transmit data in unicast or broadcast/multicast
mode.
3.3. System Features
The NPC system is based on a universal architecture that
relies on the NPC technology stack. The application archi-
tecture is based on microservices, ensuring a high degree
of system flexibility and allowing the implementation of
selected components. It also reduces the need to modify
specific services or applications, keeping the system-related
costs low. Consequently, the applications used at one place
may be easily modified and used in other parts of the sys-
tem.
The NPC is a scalable and distributed system that may be
deployed on a large scale or scaled down to a single rack
unit or even less. It is also possible to distribute the sys-
tem components and functions between multiple physical
locations.
The solution ensures low deployment and maintenance
costs due to the fact that the ES and the applications may
be developed and installed without maintenance downtime
and, what’s more, implementations are automatically exe-
cuted in a way imperceptible to the user. It is worth notic-
ing that all applications are managed within the Kubernetes
cluster.
Good interoperability of the NPC system is achieved thanks
to the availability of all relevant data through:
• documented REST API,
• custom integration with security platforms, such as
TAXII, MISP and SIEM, with a potential extension
to other platforms as well,
• dedicated API for creating new applications, adding
new vulnerability data sources or threat data integra-
tion.
The management system enables automated deployment of
applications throughout the platform, which is particularly
important when adding new entities or upgrading the ap-
plications. The system ensures:
• complete control of the entire software supply chain,
• backups and quick data restore for ESs,
• consistency of timescales throughout the NPC,
• monitoring the entire NPC and all its components,
• central analytics of logs from all NPC systems and
devices.
36
A Shared Cybersecurity Awareness Platform
It should also be noticed that management functions may
be split between the NPC application and the backbone
network, for instance, if BN management needs to be per-
formed by a separate entity.
4. Selected Solutions
4.1. Network of Interdependent Services
An expert subsystem supporting decision-making processes
and ensuring the safe provision of services by NPC users is
an essential part of the platform. It supports the identifica-
tion of interdependencies between NPC users, their services
and the ICT infrastructure used. It also allows to determine
the potential impact of incidents (scale, geographic reach,
duration), and to obtain the input data required to assess
their significance (spread of threats and assessment of their
outcomes).
The decision support subsystem is made up of four compo-
nents, as shown in Fig. 3. All service providers are surveyed
before they start the operational use of the system in order
to collect the required input data.
Ensuring the consistency of data obtained from the surveys
allows to create a network of interdependencies services.
The attributes of the network components reflect the criti-
cality (impact on other services) of the individual services
and the relationship between them [14]. The process of
managing the network of interdependent services allows
to conduct several operations, including network upgrades
and reconfigurations, depending on the needs of the system
analyst.
In order to ensure coherent and reliable security aware-
ness at the national level, a uniform approach to assess-
ing cyber threats by all NPC users is required. A concept
of evaluating the risk of unfavorable events by relying on
the Markov chain model to calculate an indicator concern-
ing the availability of interdependent services is presented
in [15]. Malinowski and Karbowski in [16] adopt a hier-
archical approach to risk assessment at the national level,
considering cyber threats and vulnerabilities identified by
service providers at a local level. The NPC system uses
its proprietary risk assessment methodology covering both
the dynamic risk analysis procedure carried out by service
providers (the so-called “own risk”) and the static and dy-
namic risk analysis procedures performed by the OCS [17].
It was assumed that an own risk results from the possibility
of violating confidentiality, integrity and availability of the
service by using the vulnerabilities of the ICT infrastruc-
ture (hardware and software) used to provide it identified
by the service provider. The results of the analysis carried
out by NPC users are reported to OCS.
The risk assessment performed at the OCS is based on
mapping service interdependencies and takes into account
threats resulting, inter alia, from the following:
• vulnerabilities identified by service providers in their
ICT infrastructure,
• criticality of the services and their interdependencies,
• the extent to which the NPC customer organization
ensures the safe rendering of the services,
• reported incidents, IoCs and other security events,
• information on security issues, obtained from various
sources, concerning the ICT infrastructure supporting
the services reported by NPC users.
Results of the risk assessment procedure are visualized
using a network of interdependent services presented in
Fig. 4. The node colors correspond to the risk values as-
signed to the specific services. The width of the lines in-
dicates the strength of specific impacts. More information
about a given service and the related risks may be ob-
tained by clicking on the selected node. The panel on the
right-hand side of Fig. 4 shows the details of the service
chosen (with a blue border), including the risk value and
its trend.
By linking the results obtained by OCS, a global cyberse-
curity awareness picture is created based on a configurable
panel with data about the current and predicted state of
service in cyberspace. The example presented in Fig. 5
shows the current status of service-related risks, statisti-
cal data concerning incidents reported and vulnerabilities
identified, the most exposed services, service threshold risk
Fig. 3. Components of the decision support subsystem.
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Fig. 4. Results of the risk assessment procedure carried out by OCS in an exemplary network of interdependent services.
(see the digital version for color images)
values, and sectoral risks. The supervising analyst is capa-
ble of customizing the layout and the content to meet the
current needs.
The situational awareness data are shared with NPC users –
to the extent and degree of detail resulting from their role,
the enabling them to respond quickly and select appropriate
measures to eliminate or limit any potential consequences.
Fig. 5. Example of a situational picture.
The analysis, provided by OCS, contains input data supplied
to the rule-based engine that is tasked with selecting ap-
propriate recommendations in order to ensure a high level
of security of the services rendered. A dedicated tool is
used for the distribution of the recommendations to service
providers.
4.2. Threat Intelligence Mechanisms
A set of threat intelligence tools is used to efficiently ex-
change information on cyber events that enable a coordi-
nated response to the threats that have been identified.
The malware information sharing protocol (MISP) is relied
upon to exchange information about network security events
and indicators of compromise (IoC). Application services,
installed in central and edge systems, perform tasks related
to MISP integration, synchronization of the databases, and
data distribution within the system. For users who do not
have their own MISP instances, a dedicated tool was de-
veloped to make this data available. The NPC ensures also
integration with the n6 platform designed to collect, process
and share information about network events and potential
security incident (IoCs). The n6 was created by CERT
(Poland) and contains information about sources of the at-
tack, i.e. URL, domain, IP, and name of malicious software
as well as other unique information if available.
The application service implemented in the OCS collects
and aggregates data on IT/OT systems’ vulnerabilities from
external public sources and converts these into the format
required by the NPC. The aggregated data and source vul-
nerabilities (i.e. before aggregation) and several related in-
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formation resources, e.g. technical bulletins, risky prod-
ucts, vulnerability relationships with other objects, are
available to all platform users. The tools used for database
management ensure the OCS analyst is able to constantly
update its contents and allow all users to search the database
quickly according to selected criteria. The database enables
service providers to identify potential threats and quickly
implement the mitigation solutions required.
The NPC users are able to share their knowledge and expe-
riences related to the specific incidents and other security
events by using a dedicated application. They can exchange
observations and conclusions from their own technical anal-
ysis. Such an analysis may being also be performed by OCS
and ES analysts and may be made available in accordance
with the applicable distribution rules. The ES is capable of
delivering sensitive data, e.g. malware code, to the OCS.
The warning feature is activated when predefined security
events occur, enabling the OCS analyst to send a warn-
ing message. The operator may also support the recipient’s
actions taken by adding attachments to the message. More-
over, all threat intelligence tools used have a built-in chat
mechanism that supports online communication.
4.3. Security Measures
The NPC incorporates a set of built-in security features for
secure sharing of sensitive information and protecting the
vital interest of the NPC users, including:
• encrypted end-to-end communications,
• marking sensitive data and configurable anonymiza-
tion,
• auditing of user actions and extensive logging, assur-
ing non-repudiation and accountability of exchanged
data.
The data shared within NPC users are encrypted at the net-
work and application layers of the OSI model. The stan-
dard IPSec protocol is used for securing VPN connections
between the NPC entities. In addition, the elliptic curves
cryptography is used at the application layer for data trans-
ferred between the NPC system’s components. The system
of X.509 certificates is applied for authentication of the
system users and signing the shared data, which ensures its
creditability.
The NPC security policy assumes that an ES user is not ca-
pable of obtaining the names and physical addresses of the
other users. The configuration data of the backbone net-
work and a list of NPC users are available only to the man-
agement system. Only the identity of the OCS is known, by
default, to all NPC users. All data sent from the ES are for-
warded to the OCS. Data targeted for other edge systems are
addressed using a symbolic recipient name. The complete
list of symbolic names is known to the management system
only. Unavailability of the data sender relies on changing
the value of the selected fields in its header to the constant
value anonymous. Sender anonymization is not performed
when messages are exchanged with the OCS. The recipient
concealment procedure is used also for “anonymous” data
receipt acknowledgement. Full confirmation is made by the
OCS only.
The system incorporates a security feature that allows the
message sender to hide sensitive data. This type of data
is marked by the user, meaning the anonymization fea-
ture replaces the selected fragment with a “xxx” of the
same length as the original text before sending the mes-
sage. Anonymization is not performed for messages sent
to the OCS. The application system guarantees that the
tagged fragment will not be retransferred to the platform
users.
Additionally, an audit service is performed to ensure ac-
countability and non-repudiation of user actions and system
functionalities. The system acquires and stores information
about all events, i.e.:
• time stamp,
• user login data,
• address of the host on which the action was per-
formed,
• name of the acted module,
• action type (e.g. create, update, send),
• subject to which the action relates (e.g. incident, vul-
nerability),
• optional additional data.
An API for the web application is used for analyzing the
collected data, enabling the search function of users’ and
system actions with the activities filtering, sorting, and cor-
relation finding.
5. System Deployment
The prototype of the NPC was developed in an operational
environment of CSIRT NASK with the participation of four
service providers from different sectors of the market (fi-
nancial, transport, energy) and an entity providing cyberse-
curity services. Three spatially distributed data centers of
CSIRT NASK were connected, via the backbone network,
with edge systems located within the service providers’ IT
infrastructure (Fig. 6). The OCS was deployed in a con-
figuration characterized by a high degree of availability,
known as dual modular redundancy, where data center num-
ber 3 acts as an arbitrator.
A full range of tests was performed to verify the function-
ality of the system and the results obtained confirmed the
system’s usability. That enables CSIRT analysts and a num-
ber of service providers to perform a trial using a prototype
of the system. The scenarios verified included user activ-
ities related to the development of a network of services,
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Fig. 6. NPC deployment in an operational environment.
reporting and handling incidents, sharing and using an ag-
gregated vulnerability database, sharing knowledge, using
threat intelligence features, assessing the risk and assessing
cyberspace security.
All this allowed the users to better understand the func-
tionalities of the NPC system and its operational value.
The test results confirmed suitability of the prototype that
may serve as a technological foundation for a full-scale
implementation of a solution that meets all applicable le-
gal requirements. The system architecture was expanded to
incorporate three (instead of one) OCSs and to make the
system accessible for all NCS entities.
The lessons learned from the deployment of NPC confirm
that the actual level of cyber threat awareness depends on all
parties involved in detecting and reacting to cyber threats
originating or maliciously installed in their technical in-
frastructure, as well as on their readiness to share cyber
threat-related information. The NPC system presented of-
fers effective features ensuring a high level of trust of the
service providers in mutual and/or external relations. It de-
livers tools for improving the user collaboration, supports
secure threat data sharing and allows to develop a shared
cybersecurity picture. All these features lead to increas-
ing the level of cyberspace awareness and help react to
the actual or potential cyber threats in a more coordinated
manner.
Future work needs to be focused on implementing the
recommendations formulated based on prototype tests and
should lead to developing an operational NPC version for
the Polish Cyber Security System. The features of the pre-
sented solution rely on the universality and flexibility of the
system architecture, support quick and effective implemen-
tation of the NPC for use cases (other than NCS) requiring
safe sharing of information about threats, creating shared
situational awareness and coordinated responses. The pre-
sented system may act as an ICT infrastructure for the Se-
curity Incidents Response Teams (SIRTs) or Information
Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACs). In particular, it can
be adapted for the safe sharing of information and building
a global situational awareness picture for security manage-
ment in complex and dispersed structure organizations.
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